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THE RICHNESS OF CONTRACT THEORY
Randy E. Barnett*
THE RICHNES S OF CONTRACT LAW: AN ANALYSIS AND CRITIQUE
OF CONTEMPORARY THEORIES OF CONTRACT LAW. By Robert A.
Hillman. Boston: Kluwer Academic Publishers. 1997. Pp. xiv,
279. $120.50.

INTRODUCTION: THE GENERATIONAL SHIFT IN
CONTRACTS SCHOLARSHIP
When I teach the doctrine of good faith performance, I assign
an exchange between two distinguished contracts scholars, Robert
Summers and Steven Burton, that has come to be known as the
"Summers-Burton" debate.1 This debate is interesting not only for
the contrasting views of its protagonists concerning the doctrine of
good faith, but also because of the generational shift in modes ,of
scholarship it represents.

In the 1950s and 1960s, contracts scholars, like so many others,
rejected so-called "conceptualist" or "formalist" approaches that
attempted to dictate the outcome of cases with general concepts
and rules. Contracts scholarship was dominated by supposedly "re
alist" inquiries into the complexities of actual commercial practice,
inquiries which sought to identify the multiple factors or considera
tions that judges do or should take into account when deciding
cases. Usually it was denied that these factors could or should be
weighted or organized in some manner in advance of a legal dis
pute. Any effort to reduce the vast complexity of the real world of
commercial practice to some verbal formula was dismissed as "re
ductionist" or "simplistic."
The Oxford English Dictionary defines "reductionist" as: "An
advocate of reductionism; one who attempts to analyse or account
for a complex theory or phenomenon by reduction."2 And it de
fines "simplistic" as: "Of the nature of, or characterized by, (ex
treme) simplicity. Now usu[ally] with the connotation of excessive
or misleading simplification."3 An 1881 example of the word's us
age captures the "realist" spirit that eventually captured the imagi* Austin B. Fletcher Professor, Boston University School of Law.
Northwestern; J.D. 1977, Harvard. rbarnett@bu.edu - Ed.
1.

See RANDY E. BARNETT, PERSPECTIVES oN CoNTRAcr LAW 250-67
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 437 (2d ed. 1989).
15 id. at 501.

2. 13
3.
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nation of legal scholars: "The facts of nature and of life are more
apt to be complex than simple. Simplistic theories are generally
one-sided and partial."4
Professor Summers is of the generation of legal academics that
was taught by the vanguard of "realisf' professors - a generation
that took their teachers' gestalt and terminology to heart. For ex
ample, to explain the implied duty of good faith performance in his
seminal 1968 article, "Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the
Sales Provisions of the Uniform Commercial Code, 5 Summers pro
posed a series of six categories of bad faith performance: (a) eva
sion of the spirit of the deal, (b) lack of diligence and slacking off,
(c) willfully rendering only "substantial performance," (d) abuse of
a power to specify contract terms, (e) abuse of a power to deter
mine compliance, and (f) interfering with or failing to cooperate in
the other party's performance.6 In terms that embody the spirit of
the realist generation (and of those whom the realists taught), Sum
mers explicitly denied that any more general conception of good
faith was helpful or even possible:
It is submitted that any but the most vacuous general definition of
good faith will . . . fail to cover all the many and varied specific mean
ings that it is possible to assign to the phrase in light of the many and
varied forms of bad faith recognized in the cases . . . .
. . . [G]eneral definitions of good faith either spiral into the Cha
rybdis of vacuous generality or collide with the Scylla of restrictive
specificity 7
.

A judge,

he advised, "should not waste effort formulating his own
reductionist definitions. Instead, he should characterize with care
the particular forms of bad faith he chooses to rule out . . . "8
In the 1970s and 1980s, this attitude .toward scholarship began to
change. Legal scholarship shifted away from realist modes toward
what came to be called "legal theory." Contracts scholarship, like
other fields, came to be dominated by scholars who risked the epi
thets of '�reductionist" and "simplistic" in search of unifying theo
ries of legal doctrine. For reasons I have elaborated elsewhere,9 I
attribute this generational shift initially to the rise of law and eco
nomics - which directly responded to the consequentialist or "pol.

4.

Id.

5. Robert S. Summers,

"Good Faith" in General Contract Law and the Sales Provisions of
the Uniform Commercial Code, 54 VA. L. REv. 195 (1968).
6. See id. at 232-43. In this same article, Summers also provides five circumstances indi
cating "bad faith in the negotiation and formation of contracts," id. at 220-32, three instances
involving "bad faith in raising and resolving contract disputes," id. at 243-48, and four forms
of "bad faith in taking remedial action," id. at 248-52.
7. Id. at 206.
8. Id. at 207.
9. See Randy E. Barnett, Contract Scholarship and the Reemergence ofLegal Philosophy,
97 HAR.v. L. REv. 1223 (1984) (book review).
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icy" concerns of the realists - and to the subsequent emergence of
normative legal philosophy that sought to trump the "conservative"
conclusions of efficiency theorists that many "progressive" legal
scholars found unpalatable. As a result, scholarship like Robert
Summers's realist lists of multiple factors that judges, in their dis
cretion, needed to take "into account," began to give way to more
systematic theories and approaches.
One of these was a comprehensive theory of good faith per
formance developed by Steven Burton, which he presented in his
1980 article, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Per
form in Good Faith.10 According to Burton, the problem of good
faith performance arises when a contract gives one party a degree
of discretion in performing, and this discretion is then used by that
party to recapture an opportunity foregone at contract formation.
So to determine whether a party has acted in bad faith, one must
identify both an opportunity objectively foregone and a subjective
intention to recapture it.
Burton contended that without "an operational standard that
distinguishes good faith performance from bad faith perform
ance,"11 the general requirement of good faith as contained in the
Uniform Commercial Code "appears as a license for the exercise of
judicial or juror intuition, and presumably results in unpredictable
and inconsistent applications."12 And he specifically took issue
with Summers's "list of factors" approach: "No effort is made to
develop a unifying theory that explains what these categories have
in common. Indeed, the assertion is made that one cannot or
should not do so."13 In contrast, Burton argued that "[r]epeated
common law adjudication, however, has enriched the concept of
good faith performance so that an operational standard now can be
articulated and evaluated."14 Burton's theory was based on "a sur
vey of over 400 cases in which courts explicitly refer to good faith in
performance,"15 but also on a basic low-tech efficiency analysis.16
Summers did not remain silent in the face of this challenge, and
his response was methodological as much as it was substantive:
My view is that all such efforts to define good faith, for purposes of a
are misguided. Such formulations provide little, if

section like 205,

10. Steven J. Burton, Breach of Contract and the Common Law Duty to Perform in Good
Faith, 94 HARv. L. REv. 369 (1980) [hereinafter Burton, Breach of Contract]; see also Steven
J. Burton, Good Faith Performance ofa Contract Within Article 2 ofthe Uniform Commercial
Code, 67 lowA L. REv. 1 (1981).
11. Burton, Breach of Contract, supra note 10, at 369.
12. Id. at 369-70 (footnote omitted).
13. Id. at 369 n.5.
14. Id. at 370 (footnote omitted).
15. Id. at 380 n.45.
16. See id. at 392-94.
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any, genuine definitional guidance. Moreover, some of them may re
strictively distort the scope of the general requirement of good
faith. . . . Finally, the very idea of good faith, if I am right, is simply
not the kind of idea that is susceptible of such a definitional
approach.17
Substantively, he argued that Burton's two-part inquiry was not
helpful to deciding cases, that it did not focus on the right things,
and that it did not go far enough.ls
Burton responded with a thoughtful, and I think persuasive, re
ply to Summers's critique, in which he characterized the difference
in their methodologies - the difference that I am calling
generational:

We want our language to call our attention to the facts that matter those that legitimately establish similarities with or significant differ
ences from the precedents. . . . We want to know which facts shall
count for more than their truth because they are legally significant.
Language can perform this function in a number of ways in addi
tion to 'positive definitions.' Professor Summers' preference for "lists
of factors generally relevant to the determination" favors one form
that could be employed, in theory. . . A second form that could be
employed, however, is the general description or model - a simpli
fied representation of a complex reality. . . . Unlike most lists of fac
tors, the general description technique encourages us to focus on
complex webs of relationships among the facts.19
.

Or, in the words of P.J. O'Rourke: "Complexities are fun to talk
about, but, when it comes to action, simplicities are often more
effective. "20

In drawing attention to a generational shift in modes of scholar
ship, I do not wish to exaggerate it. Not everyone took the tum to
unifying theory. Most notable among contracts scholars who did
not are those associated with the Wisconsin Contracts Group21 and
those who were attracted to relational theory.22 Nevertheless, both
of these schools of thought grew out of the influence of two scholars
who were born within four years of Robert Summers at the begin17. Robert S. Summers, The General Duty of Good Faith - Its Recognition and
67 CORNELL L. REv. 810, 829-30 (1982).

Concep·

tualization,

18. See id. at 830-34.
19. Steven J. Burton, More on Good Faith Performance
69 lowA L. REv. 497, 509-10 (1984).

of a Contract: A Reply to

Professor Summers,

20. PJ. O' RoURKE, EAT THE RICH: A TREATISE ON ECONOMICS 209 (1998};
A. EPSTEIN, SIMPLE RULES FOR A COMPLEX WORLD (1995).

cf.

RICH

ARD

21.

See, e.g.,

STEWART MACAULAY ET AL.,

CoNTRAcrs:

LAW IN

ACTION

(1995).

22. See, e.g., Jay M. Feinman, The Last Promissory Estoppel Article, 61 FORDHAM L.
REv. 303 (1992}. For a summary and critique of communitarian relational theory, see Randy
E. Barnett, Conflicting Visions: A Critique ofIan Macneil's Relational Theory of Contract, 78
VA. L. REv. 1175 (1992).
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ning of the Great Depression: Stewart Macaulay and Ian
Macneil.23
Summers has not been without his own influence, particularly
on his Cornell Law School colleague and casebook coauthor,24
Robert Hillman. Hillman, a 1972 graduate of Cornell himself, be
gan teaching in 1975 at the University of Iowa, where Steven
Burton arrived two years later in 1977. They taught together for
five years when, in a career move that starkly symbolizes his choice
of scholarly models, Hillman left Iowa in 198325 to join the faculty
of Cornell and his mentor Robert Summers.
I.

HILLMAN'S CRITIQUE

OF

CONTRACT

THEORY

Over the past twenty-five years, Professor Hillman has made
many valuable contributions to contracts scholarship,26 but early on
he expressed his discomfort with what he labeled "modem contract
theory." In 1988, five years after moving from Iowa to Cornell, he
published an essay, The Crisis in Modem Contract Theory,27 in
which he laid out a general critique of unifying theories, and which
he has now expanded into a book, The Richness of Contract Law.
The title of Hillman's book is intended to emphasize the fact
that contract law is far more complex and "rich" than modem uni
fying contract theories seem to acknowledge:

Contract law includes a rich combination of normative· approaches
and theories of obligation. It is divided by special rules for distinct
kinds of contracts and is subject to many exceptions and counter
principles. Despite its many dimensions, contract law is a credible, if
not flawless, reflection of the values of the surrounding society. A
highly abstract unitary theory illuminates contract law, but it cannot
explain the entire sphere. [p. 6]
Contract law and theory include contradictions and distinctions. Sub
ject to competing norms and distinct theories of obligation and to var
ious exceptions within the main body of doctrine, and divided by
special rules applying to distinct kinds of contracts, contract law does
not fit neatly into any slot. A highly abstract core theory simply can
not account for an entire subject. Instead, contract law is a plausible, if
23. Summers was born in 1933; Macaulay in 1931; and Macneil in 1929.

24. See ROBERT S. SUMMERS & ROBERT A. HILLMAN, CoNTRAcr AND RELATED OBLI
(2d ed. 1992).
25. The year after Hillman departed, Eric Anderson joined the Iowa faculty. Anderson's
subsequent contracts scholarship is clearly in the mold of Steven Burton. See, e.g., Eric An
derson, A New Look at Material Breach in the Law of Contract, 21 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1073
(1988) (providing a unified theory of material breach).
26. See, e.g., Robert A. Hillman, Court Adjustment of Long-Term Contracts: Analysis
Under Modem Contract Law, 1987 DuKE LJ. 1. I included an excerpt from this article in my
anthology, Perspectives on Contract Law. See BARNETT, supra note 1, at 357-68.
27. Robert A. Hillman, The Crisis in Modem Contract Theory, 67 TEXAs L. REv. 103
(1988).
GATION
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not perfect, reflection of various normative choices of the surrounding
society. [pp. 273-74; emphasis added, footnotes omitted]

Throughout the book, Hillman offers a number of useful in
sights about various issues of contract law and theory - as he has
in his numerous law review articles - but in this review I shall be
concerned with his overall theme: a general skepticism about "uni
fying" or "highly abstract" contract theories that fail to mirror the
richness of contract law. In this regard, he stands in the "realist"
tradition of the previous generation of contracts scholars. Hillman
attempts to justify this stance by examining a number of doctrinal
contexts: contract formation, unconscionability, and good faith.
He considers a variety of theoretical approaches: promise theorists,
reliance theorists, feminist theorists, efficiency theorists, relational
theorists, and critical legal scholars.
But though Hillman professes to be concerned with unifying
contract theories in general, he seems to be primarily troubled by
theories with which he disagrees. For example, he offers no criti
cism of feminist theory and, indeed, accepts Mary Joe Frug's char
acterization of his own analysis as "feminine. "28 After ten pages of
uncritical summary of contract theories by critical legal scholars,
Hillman concludes that he finds the "CLS [critical legal studies] in
determinacy thesis" to be "quite persuasive," though, without elab
orating, he adds, "[i]n the end, contract law is probably not as
indeterminate as CLS wants to claim" (p. 209). His critique of rela
tional theory is similarly tepid, dismissing numerous lengthy pub
lished criticisms of relationalism, which he dutifully cites,29 with a
single unsupported sentence: "These criticisms seem to underesti
mate the judicial capacity to engage in a highly contextual investiga
tion and to evaluate the relevant relational norms . . . . " (p. 260) though he allows that "one can overstate the conclusions suggested
by relationalism" (p. 260).
28. Frug concluded that my approach "neatly fits the popular interpretation of . . .
virtuous feminine attitudes toward justice" because it "is characterized by a concern for
multiple objectives, by an appreciation of contextualized relationships, and by a desire to
achieve flexibility and sharing in the administration of contract remedies." Moreover,
my analysis "offer[s] a critique of the male model which is both powerful and also remi
niscent of typical feminine criticisms of masculinity."
P. 160 (quoting Mary Joe Frug, Rescuing Impossibility Doctrine: A Postmodern Feminist
Analysis of Contract Law, 140 U. PA. L. REv. 1029, 1036, 1037 {1992) {alterations in
original)).
29. He cites the following criticisms of relationalism without identifying where any are
mistaken (p. 259 nn.82-85): MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM OF CON·
TRACT 141-42 (1994); Barnett, supra note 22, at 1200; Steven J. Burton, Default Principles,
Legitimacy, and the Authority of a Contract, 3 S. CAL. INTERD1sc. L.J. 115, 142 {1992);
Richard Craswell, The Relational Move: Some Questions from Law and Economics, 2 S.
CAL. INTERDISC. LJ. 91, 103, 108, 111 {1993); Melvin A. Eisenberg, Relational Contracts, in
Gooo FAITH AND FAULT IN CONTRACT LAw 291 (Jack Beatson & Daniel Friedmann eds.,
1995).
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This is, unfortunately, a general tendency of this book. Theories
with which Professor Hillman appears sympathetic are presented
with little or no criticism beyond footnote citations to the published
criticisms of others, wher.eas he takes to task those theories with
which he disagrees. Professor Hillman is, of course, well within his
rights to agree or disagree with particular theories - in short, to
take sides in a theoretical debate. But this book purports to be
about the deficiencies of abstract or general contract theory per se,
which he formerly had referred to as in a "crisis."30 He attempts to
claim a higher ground than those locked in "theoretical debate" (p.
7). If that is truly his thesis, then it is only selectively applied.
Moreover, just as he neglects the richness of published criticisms
of theories he likes, he overlooks the richness of contract theories
with which he disagrees. This is evident in his treatment of the ba
sis of contractual obligation. There, his rhetorical stance is to rise
above the debate between Grant Gilmore's "death-of-contract"
thesis and Charles Fried's theory of "contract-as-promise."
Hillman's argument is that
neither school has offered a compelling and definitive theory.
Although based in part on promissory principles, modem contract
law is also tempered both within and without its formal structure by
principles, such as reliance and unjust enrichment, which focus on
fairness and the interdependence of parties rather than on parties'
actual agreements or promises. Contract law is complex, contradic
tory, and, ultimately, inconclusive on what the relationship of these
principles is and should be. Moreover, by ignoring or downplaying
counter-principles and theories, some theorists camouflage contract's
complexity and hence disguise its true nature. The theoretical debate
therefore diverts the focus from the reality that promissory and non
promissory principles share the contract law spotlight, and that this is
all we can and need to know.31

Throughout the book, Hillman speaks of the complexity of con
tract law as though anyone with whom he disagrees is unaware of
this complexity. He does not seem to realize that one function of
contract theory is to understand and sort out complexity rather than
merely report it. Another is to assess contending principles and
"counter-principles and theories" (p. 7), when contract law is "ulti
mately[] inconclusive on what the relationship of these principles is
and should be" (p. 7). Still another function is to reshape and im
prove the law of contract, to move it beyond where it currently re
sides. Of course, Hillman really does understand all this. His o\vn
writings attempt these very objectives. This is merely an unfortu30.

See Hillman, supra

note

27.

31. Pp. 7-8 (footnotes omitted). In support of his claim that "some theorists camouflage
contract's complexity and hence disguise its true nature," Hillman cites Ian Macneil, of
whose abstract unifying contract theory Hillman offers no criticism. See p. 7 & n.3.
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nate posture he assumes when speaking of theories with which he
disagrees.
For someone concerned with complexities, however, Hillman
offers what the "realist" generation might call a simplistic and re
ductionist presentation of the current state of "modem contract
theory." Grant Gilmore wrote in 1974 and Charles Fried in 1981.
Hillman's book was published in 1997, though Chapter One closely
tracks his 1988 essay. In the intervening sixteen years, many others
have weighed in on these matters.

In 1986, for example, I offered a "consent theory" of contractual
obligation that differs from both Gilmore's and Fried's theories,32
though being closer to the latter than to the former. Far from ig
noring the fact that "modem contract law is also tempered both
within and without its formal structure by principles, such as reli
ance and unjust enrichment, which focus on fairness and the inter
dependence of parties" (p. 7), I surveyed the "core concerns of
contract law"33
"will, reliance, efficiency, fairness, bargain"34 and explained how, while each has merit, "none provides a compre
hensive theory of contractual obligation."35 What is needed, I sug
gested, is a "framework that specifies when one of these concerns
should give way to another."36 I proposed the criterion of mani
fested intention to be legally bound, or "consent," as the best way to
reconcile the competing demands of these disparate principles.37
Since then I have elaborated upon this approach,38 and it has been
-

32. See Randy E. Barnett, Some Problems with Contract as Promise, 77 CORNELL L. REv.
1022 (1992).
33. See Randy E. Barnett, A Consent Theory of Contract, 86 CoLUM. L. REv. 269, 271
(1986).
34. Id. Later I added "unjust enrichment" to this list. See RANDY E. BARNETI', CoNTRACTS CASES AND DOCTRINE 637-38 {1995).
35. Barnett, supra note 33, at 271.
36. Id.
37. For a summary of how "consent to be legally bound" accomplishes this integration,
see BARNETI', supra note 34, at 651-54.
38. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, Contract Remedies and Inalienable Rights, 4 Soc. PHIL. &
POLY. 179 {1986); Randy E. Barnett, . . . and Contractual Consent, 3 S. CAL. lNTERDisc. L.J.
421 {1993); Randy E. Barnett, The Function of Several Property and Freedom of Contract, 9
Soc. PHIL. & PoLY. 62 {1992); Randy E. Barnett, The Internal and External Analysis of Con·
cepts, 11 CARDozo L. REv. 525 {1990); Randy E. Barnett, Rational Bargaining Theory and
Contract: Default Rules, Hypothetical Consent, the Duty to Disclose, and Fraud, 15 HARV.
J.L. & PuB. PoLY. 783 {1992); Randy E. Barnett, Squaring Undisclosed Agency With Contract
Theory, 75 CAL. L. REv. 1969 (1987); Randy E. Barnett & Mary Becker, Beyond Reliance:
Promissory Estoppel, Contract Formalities and Misrepresentation, 15 HOFSTRA L. REv. 445
(1987).
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criticized insightfully,39 especially by Richard Craswell.40 While
nearly all of these articles are cited by Hillman, none are dis
cussed.41 In writing a book that purports to criticize the endeavor
of "unifying contract theories," one has an ·obligation to address
more comprehensively than Hillman does the richness of such theo
ries, rather than to reduce all of them to either "promise or non
promissory principles" and cite the existing literature without
comment.
True, one could fault, as others have, my attempt to adjudicate
the claims of these contending principles of core concerns of con
tract law. But the most important claim that Hillman makes in this
regard is his denial that any such adjudication is needed. Recall his
statement: "The theoretical debate therefore diverts the focus from
the reality that promissory and nonpromissory principles share the
contract law spotlight, and that is all we can and need to know" (pp.
7-8; emphasis added, footnotes omitted). While he is in good com
pany in making such a claim, I think he is wrong. At a minimum,
we should seek a theoretical reconciliation, if such can be had.
Ironically, the failure to do so will blind us to the true complexities
and richness of contract law, as it may have blinded Hillman to the
complexities of promissory estoppel.

II.

PROMISSORY ESTOPPEL AND THE NEED FOR
CONTRACT THEORY

Not too long ago, I published a short essay, The Death of Reli
ance,42 in which I reported the scholarly consensus - including
such diverse writers as Daniel Farber & John Matheson, Juliet
Kostritsky, Edward Yorio & Steve Thel, Mary Becker, and Michael
Kelly43 - that had emerged over the past fifteen years or so, that
detrimental reliance was not the key to understanding the doctrine
of promissory estoppel. The scholarly literature on that point
strongly suggested that detrimental reliance was not necessary to a
promissory estoppel theory; its existence was not alone sufficient to
support a promissory estoppel theory; and the measure of recovery
39. See, e.g., TREBILCOCK, supra note 29, at 121, 184; Peter Benson, Abstract Right and
the Possibility of a Nondistributive Conception of Contract: Hegel and Contemporary Con
tract Theory, 10 CARDOZO L. REv. 1077, 1111 n.57 (1989); Jean Braucher, Contract Versus
Contractarianism: The Regulatory Role of Contract Law, 47 WASH. & LEE L. REv. 697, 70308 (1990).
40. See Richard Craswell, Contract Law, Default Rules, and the Philosophy ofPromising,
88 MICH. L. REv. 489, 523-28 (1989). For my reply, see Randy E. Barnett, The Sound of
Silence: Default Rules and Contractual Consent, 78 VA. L. REv. 821, 874-97 (1992).
41. See, e.g., p. 18 n.61 ("For another unitary theory of contract based on consent, see
Randy E. Barnett [citing Columbia & Vrrginia Law Review articles].").
42. Randy E. Barnett, The Death of Reliance, 46 J. LEGAL Eouc. 518 (1996).
43. See id. at 522-27 (providing citations).
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in promissory estoppel cases was typically the expectation interest,
not the reliance interest. In sum, those adhering to a "reliance the
ory" of promissory estoppel were barking up the wrong tree.
Hillman disagreed. In 1998, he published an article reporting
his survey of "all of the reported decisions in the United States . . .
in which promissory estoppel was discussed from July 1, 1994
through June 30, 1996."44 While he presents many interesting find
ings about the frequency and success of actions based on promis
sory estoppel, among them is one that challenges the scholarly
consensus on promissory estoppel that I had summarized. Contrary
to the "new consensus," reliance appears to be a definite require
ment of promissory estoppel cases. The existence of reliance is dis
cussed in 27 of 29 (93.10%) of those cases in which a promissory
estoppel action succeeds on the merits and in 32 of 57 (56.14%) of
those cases in which it survives a motion to dismiss. Where promis
sory estoppel actions fail, a defect in reliance is discussed in 151 of
270 (55.93 %) of the cases, and a defect in reliance alone is discussed
in 68 of 270 (25.19%) of the cases.45
Curiously, while Hillman reports the total numbers of cases in
which the absence of a promise (129), ambiguity of a promise (28),
or refusal to accept parol evidence to prove the existence of a
promise (8), was discussed as a reason for the failure of a promis
sory estoppel action, he does not provide the percentages of total
cases these figures represent. And he does not provide the number
of cases in which the defect in the promise was the only reason
discussed by the court for the failure of a promissory estoppel
claim. We can hazard a guess at these figures from his statement in
a footnote that: "One or more reasons constituting a defect in the
promise were discussed in half of the cases (135 cases). The court
failed to discuss a defect in reliance in only 52 of those cases."46
From this information we might surmise that in 135 (50%) of the
cases, one or more defects in the promise was discussed as the rea
son for the failure of a promissory estoppel claim, and in 83 of 270
(30.74%) of the cases, the failure of a promise was the only reason
discussed - as compared with the 25.19% of the cases in which a
failure of reliance is the sole reason for denying recovery. From all
this Hillman concludes that: "Overall, the picture that emerges is
that neither promise nor reliance dominates as a judicial reason for
the failure of promissory estoppel claims. Rather, both elements
are crucial to recovery."47
44. Robert A. Hillman, Questioning the "New Consensus" on Promissory Estoppe/: An
Empirical and Theoretical Study, 98 CowM. L. R:Ev. 580, 582 (1998).
45. See id. at 589.
46. Id. at 599 n.87.
47. Id. at 599.
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Hillman's article is truly an important contribution to the prom
issory estoppel depate, and, for this reason, I have included two
excerpts from it in the forthcoming edition of my casebook. His
research shows that previous studies may well have been wrong to
dismiss reliance as a necessary basis for recovery. On the other
hand, the data might also mean that the absence of reliance was
dispositive in only twenty-five percent of the cases in which promis
sory estoppel claims are denied. That undercuts the previous wis
dom - still prevalent among most contracts professors - that
detrimental reliance is the sine qua non of promissory estoppel.48
This conclusion is also supported by the facts that (a) defects in the
promise are the only reason provided in 30.74% of the rejected
promissory estoppel claims, and (b) detrimental reliance is not dis
cussed at all in 44.07% of the cases in which promissory estoppel
actions fail. Thus, reliance may well still be dead as the exclusive
theory of promissory estoppel, which is how many contracts teach
ers still think of it.
Moreover, if one distinguishes promissory estoppel as a substi
tute for consideration (as Williston viewed it) from promissory es
toppel as a cause of action distinct from breach of contract (as the
court viewed it in Hoffman v. Red Owl Stores, 49 which many con
tracts scholars once considered to be the harbinger of the future),
then Hillman's results favor Williston's theory. To get enforcement
a plaintiff needs a "promise + something." That "something" could
be a bargain (consideration), or it could be detrimental reliance
(promissory estoppel); but, the plaintiff needs a promise in any
event, and what results is a contract that presumably must still sat
isfy other contractual requirements, such as definiteness or the
Statute of Frauds.
·

As interesting as what Hillman finds among the cases he stud
ied, however, is what he may have missed - and why he might
have missed it. Hillman looked only for discussions of reliance to
show that, contrary to the "new consensus," its presence is essential
to promissory estoppel actions. But the problem for advocates of a
"reliance theory" of promissory estoppel has always been distin
guishing reasonable, justified, or foreseeable reliance from unrea
sonable, unjustified, or unforeseeable reliance, for no contracts
theorist thinks that any and all detrimental reliance justifies a prom
issory estoppel claim.50 In other words, in addition to a promise,
the plaintiff needs "reliance + something" to get a recovery under
any reliance theory of promissory estoppel. Whatever that "some48. For a summary of the previous wisdom, see Barnett, supra note 42, at 518-22.
49. 133 N.W.2d 267 (WIS. 1965).
50. See, e.g., R:EsTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CoNTRAcrs § 90 (1981) (referring to a "prom
ise which the promisor should reasonably expect to induce" reliance by the promisee).
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thing" is, it cannot be reliance, which is present in any event. Thus,
all reliance theories of promissory estoppel require appeal to some
factor apart from reliance to distinguish enforceable promises
(which are accompanied by reliance) from unenforceable ones, and
this is an element that reliance theorists have been unsuccessful in
identifying.
For this reason, it would have been helpful if Hillman had ex
amined the cases in which the presence or absence of reliance was
discussed, not only to "questionO the 'new consensus' on promis
sory estoppel,"5 1 but also to see if he could discern the qualities
other than reliance that made reliance sufficient or insufficient.
This would have required Hillman to be more sensitive to the nu
ances of contract theory than he appears to be when he claims in
The Richness of Contract Law that "[t]he theoretical debate there
fore diverts the focus from the reality that promissory and non
promissory principles share the contract law spotlight, and that is all
we can and need to know. " (pp. 7-8). If that is all we can know so
be it, but it is hardly all we need to know.
Fortunately and coincidentally, at the time Hillman was con
ducting his research, another contracts scholar, Sidney DeLong,
was conducting a very similar survey of decided promissory estop
pel cases. In his article, The New Requirement ofEnforcement Reli
ance in Commercial Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 5z

DeLong surveys "all of the promissory estoppel cases reported in
1995 and 1996."53 On this basis he, like Hillman, also takes issue
with part of the "death of reliance" thesis I earlier presented.54
In particular, he confirms Hillman's principal finding that the
presence of reliance is indeed a requirement of promissory estop
pel: "A legion of unhappy plaintiffs can bear witness to the contin
ued vitality of the actual reliance requirement, having discovered
that a commercial promise is not alone sufficient to ground a claim
under Section 90."55 He also confirms Hillman's claim that both
reliance and a promise are needed to sustain an action for promis
sory estoppel: "It is true that in many cases, opinions affirming the
51. Hillman, supra note 44.
52. Sidney W. DeLong, The New Requirement of Enforcement Reliance in Commercial
Promissory Estoppel: Section 90 as Catch-22, 1997 Wis. L. REv. 943.
53. Id. at 948.
54. His data "moderately" confirm the claim that the expectation interest, not the reli
ance interest, is the normal measure of recovery in contracts cases. See id. at 979-81.
Hillman's data too undercut any claim that the reliance interest is the prevailing measure of
damages in promissory estoppel cases. The expectation interest is regularly awarded. See
Hillman, supra note 44, at 601.
55. DeLong, supra note 52, at 981; see also id. at 984 ("Every single opinion that men
tioned the matter instead affirmed the Restatement requirement that the plaintiff actually
rely . . . . Considered as a group, these holdings lay to rest Farber and Matheson's assessment
that actual reliance is no longer an element of a claim of promissory estoppel.").
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necessity for reliance element also involved some other missing ele
ment. The most common defect was the absence of a clear and
distinct promise . . . . "56 And he takes issue with my claim that a
manifested intention to be legally bound should be sufficient for
contractual enforcement even in the absence of a bargain or detri
mental reliance.57
DeLong's objective was not, however, simply to debunk the
"new consensus" on promissory estoppel but also to refine existing
general theories so as to understand better when reliance was suffi
cient to justify the enforcement of a promise and when it was insuf
ficient. What he finds is intriguing: Courts appear to make a
distinction between what DeLong terms "performance reliance"
and "enforcement reliance." With performance reliance, the
"promisee relies solely on her estimate of the 1ikelihood that the
promisor will perform, without any expectation of a legal remedy if
the reliance is disappointed."58 With enforcement reliance, the
"promisee relies both on the credibility of the promise and on the
belief that she will have a legal remedy for some or all of the costs
of disappointed reliance if the promise is not performed."59 While
not claiming the existence of a judicial consensus on the matter, he
does notice the following:

Many of the opinions reported.in 1995 and 1996 lend support to the
thesis that, in order to prevail on a promissory estoppel claim, a com- .
mercial promisee must now dexµonstrate not only that her reliance
was reasonable in light of the likelihood that the promisor would per
form [that is, performance reliance], but also that she had a reason
able belief that the promise was legally enforceable when made [that
is, enforcement reliance]. Excluding those promises that are already
enforceable under bargain contract theory, this requires that the
promisor manifest an affirmative intention that the promise be en56. Id. at 985-86 (footnote omitted). This passage continues: "Many of the 1995-96 cases,
however, denied promissory estoppel claims on the sole ground that plaintiff had not demon
strated actual, detrimental reliance. The absence of actual reliance was decidedly determina
tive, not merely make-weight, in these cases." Id. at 986-87 (footnote omitted).
57. For Barnett, . . . the Section 90 promise becomes binding when it is made, regard
less of the presence or absence of subsequent reliance by the promisee. Because he
contends that actual reliance should be unnecessary to enforceability under Section 90,
Barnett's consent theory cannot account for the courts' continuing insistence on actual
reliance and their refusal to enforce non-bargain promises in its absence.
Id. at 995. But later, DeLong himself provides a possible answer to this challenge:
[U]nder Barnett's analysis a person who manifests an intention to be legally bound to
perform a promise might also expressly or implicitly condition the promisee's power to
enforce the promise on her actual reliance, or might expressly or implicitly reserve a
power to rescind the promise at any time before such reliance.
Id. at 1000.
58. Id. at 953. The passage continues: "The promisee decides whether and how much to
rely by assessing the promisor's honesty and reliability, the circumstances bearing on the
probability of performance and breach, the benefits that reliance followed by performance
would confer, and the costs that disappointed reliance would impose." Id.
59.

Id.
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forceable at the time of the promise. As the promise and consent
theorists insist, the ensuing reliance is reasonable because the promise
is enforceable, not vice versa.60
In sum, "the 1995-96 case sample contains several decisions sug
gesting that a manifestation of consent to be legally bound may be
becoming essential to liability under Section 90."61 Moreover some
"decisions support what might be called the negative half of the
consent theory of Section 90, which is both traditional and largely
noncontroversial: one who expresses an intention not to be legally
bound usually will not be. "62
One way to demonstrate the richness of contract theory and its
importance to understanding contract law, then, is simply to read
both Hillman's and DeLong's articles and ask which tells one more
about contract law. Of course, Hillman can always go back and
reexamine his data to see if it confirms DeLong's :findings.63 But
this would only be to demonstrate that knowing "that promissory
and nonpromissory principles share the contract law spotlight" (p.
8), was not all he needed to know to understand the richness of
contract law.
Another way is to examine Hillman's treatment of promissory
estoppel.in The Richness of Contract Law. The book contains none
of the empirical information just discussed, but it is clear that
Hillman disagreed with those who emphasized promise over reli
ance before he embarked upon his study. In his chapter "Theories
of Promissory Estoppel: Reliance and Promise," he takes issue
with "promise theorists" - in particular, Farber & Matheson64 and
Yorio & Tuel. He offers one interesting insight in response to Yorio
& Thel's claim that reliance theory cannot explain the courts' insis
tence on the existence of a promise:65 "But Section 90 focuses on
promise-induced reliance because other theories, such as equitable
estoppel and misrepresentation, already protect injured parties
60. Id. at 1003. The passage continues:
Although the promisor's manifestation of intention to be bound is critical to these cases,
the court's focus is usually on the promisee's actual or presumed understanding of that
manifestation. Enforcement is denied if the court finds that the promisee was or should
have been aware that the promise was not intended to create an enforceable obligation.
Id.

61. Id. at 994.
62. Id. at 995.
63. Hillman notes that "Professor Sydney W. DeLong's impressive study of promissory
estoppel cases was published too late to be discussed in this Article." Hillman, supra note 44,
at 581 n.3.
64. The article he criticizes is Daniel A. Farber & John H. Matheson, Beyond Promissory
Estoppel: Contract Law and the "Invisible Handshake," 52 U. CHI. L. REv. 903 (1985).
65. See Edward Yorio & Steve Tuel, The Promissory Basis ofSection 90, 101 YALE L.J.
111, 161-62 (1991) ("[R]eliance theory does not explain why in Section 90 cases courts insist
that there be a promise. If the basis of recovery were harm caused by the defendant's con
duct, it should not matter whether the conduct constituted a promise." (footnote omitted)).
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from conduct and statements inducing detrimental reliance. Prom
issory estoppel plugs the gap in liability by creating liability for
promise-induced reliance" (p. 68). Mostly, however, he questions
their interpretation of, or overgeneralization from, the cases they
discuss - a critique that is considerably less persuasive, as a de
scriptive matter, than his later empirical study.
Hillman's need for an enriched theory of promissory estoppel is
most apparent whenever he moves beyond describing judicial deci
sions to make normative suggestions for how courts ought to treat
cases. For example, when discussing the need to distinguish reli
ance that merits protection from that which does not - the critical
stumbling block for reliance theories of promissory estoppel - he
says: "Foreseeability of the reliance seems a reasonable tool for dis
tinguishing detrimental reliance that should and should not be com
pensated" (p. 68; emphasis added). No reason for this intuition is
provided. He says:

Courts should also consider a promisor's good faith, for example, by
taking into account the reasons for the broken promise. A court, with
some justification, may want to punish a bad faith promisor by award
ing expectation damages. Conversely, if a promisor acted in good
faith and expectancy damages vastly exceed reliance damages, a court
may choose the latter. [p. 76; emphases added, footnote omitted]
No justification for these recommendations is given. He says:

Courts should evaluate defenses to bargained-for contracts more
fully, for example, before they subvert them by granting expectancy
damages under promissory estoppel. A court may conclude that a
defense has outlived its usefulness and therefore decide the case on
bargain grounds. Alternatively, a court may validate a contract de
fense, but conclude that a promisee's reliance also merits some relief.
[pp. 75-76; emphases added]
No guidance is offered as to when courts ought to choose one alter
native or the other.

To support any of these normative suggestions, Hillman's con
cluding observation that "reliance theory creates a flexible, evolv
ing, context-dependent obligation" (p. 77) is simply no substitute
for a theory of promissory estoppel, such as that provided by
Sydney DeLong. But it neatly captures the instincts of the "realist"
generation of contracts scholars who preceded him.
CONCLUSION: THE BEST LAW SCHOOL SUBJECT
When I was considering how I would write this review, I had
decided to begin by making the provocative, and not entirely seri
ous, claim that contracts was the best subject in which to specialize
as a law professor. First, there are the merits of contracts scholar
ship. The signal-to-noise ratio in the contracts literature is extraor
dinarily high. Contracts scholarship is of uniformly excellent
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quality; I rarely fail to learn from any article on contract law I read,
and contract law publications are not too numerous to keep up
with. There is a lot of long-standing and intricate contract doctrine
to understand and integrate, so doing contract theory is both hard
and rewarding.
Probably because there are so few active contracts scholars at
the most elite schools, contracts scholars seem to place a very low
premium on the status or institutional affiliations of other contracts
scholars.66 Everyone with something to say gets a real hearing.
Though it is harder to place a contract article in elite journals, this
also means that contracts scholars are accustomed to finding and
taking seriously excellent articles in less prestigious journals. More
over, as the discourse chronicled above suggests, contracts scholars
take each other's ideas very seriously - testing and probing them
with vigor. And I think real progress is made over time as a result
of this scholarly exchange.
Then there are the advantages of teaching contracts. Contracts
is a basic first-year course so we get to teach students when they are
at their most engaged. At many schools, contracts still run through
a full year, so we can teach it in greater depth than any one
semester course. Contracts is a course that raises fundamental
questions of both justice and efficiency. In addition to the great
debates among legal titans - Langdell, Holmes, Williston, Corbin,
Cohen, Fuller, Llewellyn, Gilmore, Farnsworth, Macneil, Atiyah,
Simpson, Horowitz, Fried, and the list goes on and on - there is a
wonderful history of contract law to learn and teach. And the con
tracts literature includes more than the usual number of articles
about the real story behind the classic contracts cases.
To my great surprise, however, by the time I sat down to write
the review, I found that I had been preempted by none other than
Robert Hillman and Robert Summers in an essay entitled The Best
Law School Subject, 67 in which they claim that "contract law is by
far the best law school subject to teach and to learn."68 They ask:

What other subject contains such a wealth of theory, doctrine, and
substantive reasoning? What other subject focuses so clearly on es
sential components of economic and other organization in our society,
66. One of the drawbacks to being a contracts scholar is that the more prestigious the Jaw
school, the Jess obligation there appears to be to hire contracts scholars to teach first-year
contracts classes. The prejudice is that contracts is a course that "anyone can teach." While
this is too bad for anyone seeking to climb the ladder, it helps ensure that, among contracts
scholars, one's reputation depends less on one's affiliation and more on one's writings than in
most other subjects. Another drawback is that one rarely gets invited to speak at other law
schools on contract Jaw topics, as compared with, say, the Ninth Amendment.
67. Robert A. Hillman & Robert S. Summers, The Best Law School Subject, 21 SEATILE
U. L. Rev. 735 (1998). This is a reply to a review of their casebook by Sydney DeLong. See
Sydney W. DeLong, An Agnostic's Bible, 20 SEATILE U. L. Rev. 295 (1997) (book review).
68. Hillman & Summers, supra note 67, at 735.
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namely private agreements and exchange transactions? What subject
better exemplifies the power of general theory, the functions and lim
its of the common law, the rise of statutory law, the interaction of
rights and remedy, and the role of various legal actors in our system
(including transactors, lawyers in their various roles, judges, and
lawmakers)?69
Moreover they emphasize how much fun it is to teach contracts, in
part perhaps because "students come to the subject with low expec
tations. Invariably they are more than pleasantly surprised to see
how interesting and exciting it is to learn about what promises soci
ety legally enforces and why."70
On this issue, then, there is no generational conflict. And I
would add that, despite our disagreements, having active scholars
like Robert Hillman with whom to exchange proposals and criti
cisms makes doing contracts theory both a challenge and a joy.

69. Id. at 735 (footnote omitted). In his review, DeLong observes that Hillman and
Summers's casebook "offers no hope of rationalizing the[ ] different principles [of obligation]
with each other or establishing authoritative ways of deciding cases when the principles come
into conflict" and characterizes this as "both a strength and a weakness." DeLong, supra
note 67, at 307. Hillman and Summers respond that they never attempted "to resolve the
conflicts among the theories in one grand revelation. Indeed, no one has yet formulated a
satisfactory 'unified field theory of civil obligation' and we doubt that anyone ever will or
could." Hillman & Summers, supra note 67, at 737 (quoting DeLong).
70. Hillman & Summers, supra note 67, at 735.

